University of Southern Maine

USM Digital Commons
Climate Change

New England Environmental Finance Center
(NEEFC)

4-2007

RGGI Allowances: How to Use the Revenues?
Samuel B. Merrill
Muskie School of Public Service

Sondra Bogdonoff
Muskie School of Public Service

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.usm.maine.edu/climatechange

Recommended Citation
Merrill, Samuel B. and Bogdonoff, Sondra, "RGGI Allowances: How to Use the Revenues?" (2007). Climate
Change. 5.
https://digitalcommons.usm.maine.edu/climatechange/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the New England Environmental Finance Center (NEEFC)
at USM Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Climate Change by an authorized administrator of
USM Digital Commons. For more information, please contact jessica.c.hovey@maine.edu.

Muskie School of Public Service
April 2007

How to use the revenues?
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI, pronounced
“Reggie”) is the first regional mandatory program to address global
warming pollution from power plants in the United States. In
December 2005, after two years of planning, the governors of
seven states (Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Connecticut,
New Jersey, New York and Delaware)* signed a 20-page Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) adopting a plan for reducing carbon
dioxide (CO2). A year later, the states released a draft model rule
outlining regulations for participating state governments to use in
RGGI’s adoption and implementation at the state level. RGGI will
take effect in 2009, and mandate that total emissions in the RGGI
states may not increase from 2009 to 2014, and then must fall by
2.5% per year through 2018.
What are emission allowances?
Emission allowances are the currency of the emissions trading
market set up by RGGI’s cap and trade system. One emission
allowance equals one ton of CO2 emissions. Maine’s total emissions level is capped at 5.95 million tons, or 5.95 million allowances.
Each regulated power plant must have sufficient allowances to
meet its CO2 compliance levels. The state can auction or give away
emission allowances, and power plants are free to buy and sell
excess allowances under the cap. RGGI specifies that each state

* Since then, Maryland, Massachusetts and
Rhode Island have joined as well.
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must sell or auction at least 25% of the allowances, with the proceeds used for
public benefit, but can decide individually whether to auction a greater
percentage.
After a series of roundtable discussions across the state, the Maine Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) developed a bill for the 123rd legislature to authorize implementation of the rule. One of the major provisions
of this bill requires Maine to auction 100% of the emission allowances with an
exception for co-generation plants (see below).
This paper examines the following question: When the allowances are
auctioned, how should the funds be used?
How much revenue for public benefit will be generated?
The amount of funds available for public benefit depends on 1) the total
number of allowances auctioned and 2) the cost of an allowance.
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The bill (LD 1851) before Maine’s legislature supports the intent of generating
a large pool of resources for public benefit programs, while acknowledging cost
concerns of the regulated generators, specifically, the two plants within Maine
that are combined cycle co-generation plants. By co-locating with an industrial
plant (two paper companies in Maine’s case) steam produced as a by-product
of the industrial process becomes an additional source of power. Often called
combined heat and power (CHP), they are among the most efficient of electric
generators. Under LD 1851, DEP would set aside a portion of the state’s
annual allowances (lowering the number of allowances available for sale) to
cover that portion of CHP emissions related to electricity generated for the
manufacturing facility itself, and not transmitted to a distribution utility.
Even at the lowest estimated cost of allowances, the RGGI program will
create a substantial new market. Maine’s allocation under RGGI is approximately six million emission allowances; cost on the open market is projected
between $1 – $10 per allowance. If 85% of Maine’s six million allowances are
auctioned (with approximately 15% set aside for co-generation plants1), at an
average price of $2 – $5 an allowance, the state could conservatively expect
between $10.2 – $25.5 million per year in new funds for public benefits.

How should the proceeds be used?

Efficiency Maine

Options for use of these new funds, and an understanding of their benefit to cost ratio, are integral
components of RGGI’s future success. Proceeds
from the sale of allowances can be used for energy
efficiency programs, renewable energy development, and direct consumer rebates that will protect
electricity consumers against the possible costs of
RGGI.2 The following are possible options for use
of public benefit funds:

A look at Efficiency Maine, a program of the Maine
Public Utilities Commission, provides an example
of what might be expected from investments in
energy efficiency. After four years of operation,
Efficiency Maine is now a key partner for residential and business customers, fostering cost-effective
electricity savings, reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and helping Maine businesses stay economically competitive. In essence, Efficiency Maine is
now the statewide “efficiency utility” and has
cumulatively, since 2004, saved 1,231,241 megawatt
hours (MWh) of lifetime savings, equivalent to the
annual electrical consumption of 180,000 Maine
homes.

Energy Efficiency Programs
Reduction of greenhouse gases appears particularly
likely to occur through investment in energy efficiency programs. By increasing spending on energy
efficiency, RGGI could assist electricity customers
in cutting their monthly bills by lowering electricity
consumption without lowering services (installing
energy saving light bulbs, high-efficiency refrigeration or motors, etc.).
RGGI modeling has examined impacts from
doubling current spending on efficiency programs
in the nine original RGGI states (as is approximately
projected to be the case in Maine). The analysis
found that if such doubling were continued for 15
years, the average household would see its electric bill fall by about $100 a year, or roughly 12%.
Business customers would gain a similar savings.3
For New England, the RGGI modeling suggests that
efficiency programs could achieve electricity savings for about one third the cost of generating the
same amount of power. In coming years, more than
enough cost-effective efficiency potential is available to completely cancel out projected growth in
electricity demand.4

Efficiency Maine’s 2006 annual report (budget of
$9.2 million) lists the following accomplishments:
4 74,759 MWh annual savings
4 $53.9 million lifetime economic benefits for
installed equipment
4 2.7 to 1 program-wide benefit-cost ratio
4 $0.029 per kilowatt hour (kWh) for efficiency
savings
4 700,000 compact fluorescent lightbulbs (CFLs)
rebated
4 320,849 metric tons of lifetime carbon dioxide
(CO2) emission reductions last year.

In addition to the regional forecasts for efficiency
spending, initial data is available from the Maine
Public Utilities Commission (PUC), and presumably more analysis can be developed during the
course of rulemaking proceedings that will supply
the RGGI implementation details. Taking as a price
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basis the marginal cost of generating excess power
(which reflects how prices are currently set), the
Maine PUC shows the relative expected increases
in energy efficiency at different costs per carbon
allowance over the next 20 years (Fig. 1). Although
this is only illustrative and does not necessarily
reflect actual prices, it is a reasonable approach that
attempts to show the relationship between cost
per megawatt and the effect of that price (and the
dollars it would generate) on energy efficiency
activity.5 The PUC analysis shows that, over a 20year period, energy savings and electrical cost
increases roughly cancel each other out. For
example, if allowances cost $2 per ton, savings will
be greater than cost increases for most of the
20-year period, and this effect will peak in 2016. If
allowances cost $5 or $7 per ton, a similar
pattern is observed but the cost is larger by a
factor of roughly 2.5 or 3, respectively.
Tailored to Maine’s energy policy context, these
data reinforce RGGI modeling results and suggest
that, at several possible initial auction prices, invest

ments in energy efficiency programs will lower
costs for all customers and will deliver additional
savings to individual program participants over time.
Other (Non-electric) Energy Efficiency
Another potential use of RGGI auction proceeds is
investment in non-electric energy efficiency
opportunities, which would reduce consumption
of other forms of energy by the end-user, such as
natural gas, fuel oil, kerosene, propane. Costeffective energy efficiency opportunities include
home weatherization, upgrading commercial and
industrial heating and cooling systems, and
promoting high-efficiency furnaces and boilers.
The benefit to cost ratio of these non-electric
efficiency programs in other states is typically
higher than that experienced by electric efficiency
programs, delivering between $3 and $4 of
benefit for every $1 invested. Increased efficiency
in the economy’s consumption of natural gas can
also help dampen price spikes for that commodity

which, to the extent it is used in power plants that
set the marginal price in the New England power
pool, will also keep electric wholesale prices lower.
Non-electric energy efficiency projects also
deliver very significant reductions in greenhouse
gas emissions. However, it should be noted that
there is no direct link between the beneficiaries
of the non-electric projects and the source of the
RGGI funds (electricity customers), nor will the
resulting reduction in demand for these nonelectric energy supplies help drive down the
cost of RGGI allowances.

electricity bills. This approach could be designed
to credit all customer classes in proportion to the
amount of electricity they consume. It is also
possible to target rebates only for the most vulnerable customer groups, although this can be difficult
to implement. Electricity rates send signals to
consumers (lower rates or rebates tend to increase
usage), so care must be taken not to undermine
the conservation incentives that are a critical aspect
of RGGI. Another option is to provide a fixed
rebate per household (not a rebate that rises with
consumption level) so that the consumer can
pocket any savings achieved from reduced

Energy and sequestration research

consumption.

Funds could also be directed to other programs
with potential to reduce greenhouse gas emissions or increase sequestration of carbon—such as
support for renewable energy start-up firms and
research in new alternative energy technologies.
Funding clean energy technologies would stimulate
or reward investment in the research and development of new innovative carbon emissions abatement technologies and promote renewable or
non-carbon emitting energy advances such as wind,
solar and geothermal power generation. Funding
for research on the carbon sequestration function

However, because there is a finite supply of funding
from an auction of RGGI allowances, every dollar spent on a rebate is one less dollar that can be
spent on energy efficiency. A dollar allocated to
rebates saves some customers one dollar, but delivers no additional benefit in the form of reduced
energy consumption, no lowered demand for RGGI
allowances, nor any additional greenhouse
gas reductions.

of forests and agricultural lands and possible ways
to establish eligible carbon “offsets” for improved
management practices on these lands could similarly achieve carbon reductions and deliver financial
benefits to the local economy.

States may make their own decisions of how much
of the revenue generated should be spent on
which option. One hybrid option is threshold
pricing. In this model, auction proceeds are
allocated to energy efficiency programs up to
a certain price per ton, and any additional proceeds
are allocated to one or more of the other options.
For example, in Maine, LD 1851 from the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) suggests
that up to an auction price of $5 a ton, 100% of
the proceeds be spent on efficiency programs, and

Rebates
A portion of revenues generated from the sale of
allowances could also be allocated to directly
reduce impacts from the RGGI program on

Combined approaches



any amount obtained at auction prices over $5 a
ton will be spent on rebates to electric ratepayers
based on usage. This strategy attempts to protect
the consumer from possible cost increases brought
on by the higher cost of emission allowances.
Conclusion
When implemented, RGGI will reduce greenhouse
gases, produce new funds for the public benefit,
and provide an opportunity to help shape Maine’s
economic future. As described above, RGGI
auction proceeds, based on current analysis and
past efforts, will most productively be invested
in energy efficiency projects. There appears to be
ample room for increased energy efficiency that
will:
• Reduce overall demand for electricity (which
in turn will reduce demand for, and cost of,
RGGI allowances, benefiting all customers) and
• Encourage consumers to reduce their carbon
emissions, so that any increase in energy 		
prices could be more than offset.
To date, analyses of energy efficiency measures
have focused on their affect on electricy costs and
CO2 reduction. They do not address the question
of whether any portion of the proceeds allocated
to research in new renewable energy technologies,
or to customer rebates, would produce a comparable reduction in greenhouse gas emissions.
Whether threshold pricing is approved or not,
policymakers should require an analysis from the
PUC of whether rebates—and other possible uses
of auction proceeds—do, over time, achieve the
public purposes intended.



The RGGI states are being closely watched6 and
standards are being set for the country to follow.
Keeping the public benefits of RGGI at the
forefront of upcoming policy discussions will be
critical in helping Maine and other states adapt to
the changing economy in a carbon-constrained
world. At the same time, using the RGGI funds
wisely can help the state manage and reduce
energy costs while lowering total greenhouse gas
pollutants.
Endnotes
1. This is currently proposed in LD 1851, in order to incentivize energy
efficiency at cogeneration plants.
2. See, for example, slide 4 of L. Petraglia and D. Breger, “REMI Impacts for
RGGI Policies based on the Std REF & Hi-Emission REF”. November 17, 2005.
(www.rggi.org/docs/remi_stakeholder_presentation_11_17_05-final.ppt)
3. Lifetime economic benefits and the benefit-cost ratios are calculated by
estimating the total lifetime electricity reductions of the efficient products
multiplied by future avoided energy costs and adjusted for total program and
participant costs all discounted to the present year.
4. The average Maine residential customer consumes 6,817 kWh per year.
Energy Information Administration, 2004. http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/esr/table12.xls.
5. Data from the Maine Public Utilities Commission, April 2007.
6. As one example, on June 20-21 2007 there will be a “Renewable Energy
Finance Forum” on Wall Street, during which finance analysts, entrepreneurs,
and state policymakers from around the country will discuss RGGI as a
potential model for other groups of states to follow, and prospects for a national versus a regional cap and trade market. (http://www.euromoneyenergy.
com/default.asp?page=13&eventid=ECK162&site=energy)

